We present two related methods for creating MasterPrints, synthetic fingerprints that are capable of spoofing multiple people's fingerprints. These methods achieve results that advance the state-of-the-art for single MasterPrint attack accuracy while being the first methods capable of creating Master-Prints at the image level. Both of the methods presented in this paper start with training a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) on a set of real fingerprint images. The generator network is then used to search for fingerprints that maximize the probability of matching with most subjects in a dataset. The first method uses evolutionary search in the space of latent variables, and the second method uses gradient-based optimization. The unique combination of evolution and GANs is able to design a MasterPrint that a commercial fingerprint system matches to 23% of all users in a strict security setting, and 77% of all users at a looser security setting.
Introduction
Fingerprints are commonly, and increasingly, used for authentication in a large variety of systems. They are used for unlocking doors, unlocking personal data on smartphones, and authorizing payments. A person's fingerprint has become their new signature. Unfortunately, like a signature, fingerprints can be faked. Fingerprints are vulnerable, as are all biometrics, to presentation attacks, where the attacker presents a spoofed fingerprint to the authentication system (Uludag and Jain 2004) , (Ratha, Connell, and Bolle 2001) , (Matsumoto et al. 2002) .
Since this type of attack does not need any knowledge of the matcher, image specifications or database access privileges, it represents a realistic threat for fingerprint verification systems used in mobile devices (Frank 2013) , (Sousedik and Busch 2014) . Further, it was recently pointed out that smartphone sensors are particularly vulnerable (Roy, Memon, and Ross 2017) . Due to the demand for quick matches, low cost, and the decreasing space left for fingerprint sensors, smartphones use small sensors that only read part of the fingerprint (Han, Marciniak, and Westerman 2014) . Small sections of the fingerprint are not nearly as unique as a full fingerprint and leave smartphones open to a particularly vicious type of presentation attack.
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There have already been instances where hackers have used images of fingerprints to get access to people's fingerprints. Jan Krissler was able to get spoof to the German Defense Minister's fingerprints just from publicly available images (Hern 2014) . In this work, we look at the case where a single synthetic fingerprint can spoof many people's fingerprints.
Previous work (Roy, Memon, and Ross 2017) has shown that it is possible to perform a dictionary attack on a partial fingerprint dataset with substantial accuracy using a set of carefully chosen "MasterPrints", partial fingerprints that can fool fingerprint recognition software into matching a large number of people.This means it is possible to spoof fingerprints for subjects for which the attacker has no information. The work thus far has generated MasterPrints at the "template level" by manipulating the minutiae, a relatively high-level representation of fingerprints. They relied on stochastic search in the space of minutiae to generate synthetic Masterprint template, which cannot easily be translated to high-quality fingerprint images. However, to launch a spoof-attack in practice, it is required to construct a Mas-terPrint at the "image level" which can then be transferred to a real physical artifact (Feng and Jain 2011) , (Cao, Liu, and Jain 2014) , (Jain and Cao 2015) , (Cao and Jain 2015a) . This observation motivated us to find a method for generating MasterPrint images which are visually similar to natural fingerprint images.
To design MasterPrint images, there needs to be a way to feasibly search the space of fingerprint images for the ideal image. Since not all authentication systems use minutiae, it is best if minutiae are not used during the design process. Neural networks can be used to generate synthetic fingerprint images. In particular, Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) have shown great promise in generating images that reproduce a particular style or domain. However, their standard design does not allow the generator to target additional constraints and objectives beyond reproducing the style of the training data. For a MasterPrint, we need to create a synthetic fingerprint that fools a fingerprint verification system. The verification system not only has to recognize that the image is a fingerprint, but also match the fingerprint to many different identities. Therefore, a generator network would need to be combined with a way of searching for fingerprints that are suitable for MasterPrints.
In this paper, we present two related techniques for creating
MasterPrints. Both methods start with training a GAN to create partial fingerprint images based on a corpus of either capacitive or ink rolled fingerprint images. The first method uses evolutionary optimization to search the latent variables of the neural network for a MasterPrint. A Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategy (CMA-ES) is used to search for the inputs to the the generator network that creates images that are recognized as many separate fingerprints as possible by a commercial fingerprint recognition software. This unique combination of evolution and neural networks allows the neural network to constrain the search space while the evolutionary algorithm can handle the discrete fitness function.
The second method removes the reliance on an external fingerprint recognition software. We train a multi-label, neural network-based fingerprint classifier. We then use gradient descent to find fingerprint images that maximize the number of activated outputs. The classifier allows us to tell the generator exactly what type of image we are interested in.
Previous work pointed out the vulnerability but did not show a path to exploit the vulnerability through producing an actual image-level MasterPrint. This work directly shows how to produce this exploit and is able to spoof 22% of the subjects in our dataset with an authentication system that has a 0.1% false match rate. With a 1% false match rate we spoof 78% of the subjects in the dataset. This work gets the state of the art one step closer to generating synthetic fingerprints that have an unacceptably high chance of unlocking any random phone. The cost of creating synthetic fingers based on images is high, but it is well documented and would only have to be done once for a MasterPrint attack. By demonstrating how to create MasterPrints, we show that this is a real vulnerability that needs to be addressed.
Background Fingerprint presentation attacks
Recently, Roy et al. (Roy, Memon, and Ross 2017) studied the vulnerability of fingerprint-based biometric systems that have small sensors for authentication and therefore only scan part of the fingerprint. They found these systems are highly susceptible to a type of presentation attack (Une, Otsuka, and Imai 2007) that is known as a "MasterPrint attack". A MasterPrint is a biometric sample, real or synthesized, that impersonates multiple subjects' biometrics. This type of attack does not require an individual's biometric sample but instead is be deployed against unknown people with some probability of a successful attack.
Small fingerprint scanners are too small to read the entire fingerprint and therefore the system must authenticate on just the cross-section of the finger that is read from the sensor. Since it would be impractical to require the user to place their finger the exact same way every time, these systems normally take multiple readings from the same finger during enrollment.
When an input is presented to the system during verification, it compares the input against all the partial prints that it has for a subject. If a subject has n fingers in the system and there are k partial prints saved per fingerprint, then there are n × k opportunities for a match and the system only needs a match one of them. This type of setup is common on consumer mobile devices.
Roy et al. (Roy, Memon, and Ross 2017) showed that there exist synthetic MasterPrints that serendipitously match a large proportion of the fingerprint population in a dataset. Their method represents fingerprints as minutiae templates. A minutiae template represents all the points of interest in a fingerprint. This includes where ridges end, where they split, and the angle going away from that point. Many fingerprint identification systems will first identify the minutiae in the fingerprint and then compare them to the minutiae template saved in the system. Roy et al then use a hill-climbing algorithm to search for a minutiae template to use for a Mas-terPrint attack; the objective function is the number of people in the database that the fingerprint matches with. However, it may be noted that the MasterPrints generated by Roy et al. cannot be used directly to launch a spoof attack. Reconstruction of "image level" MasterPrints is needed from these "template level" MasterPrints (Cao and Jain 2015b) . This reconstruction step is a lossy technique which may reduce the attack accuracy and relies on the authentication system to use minutiae.
In this work, we generate the MasterPrint images directly instead of working with minutiae templates. The advantage of the proposed approach is that by working at the image level it is possible to optimize for systems that don't use minutiae, systems such as the iPhone (Apple 2017).
Image generation
Recently, there have been rapid advancements in image generation by way of neural networks. Some of the most popular methods for image generation are Fully Visible Belief Networks (FVBN), Variational Autoencoders (VAE), and Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) (Goodfellow 2016) . FVBNs such as PixelRNN produce one pixel at a time, similar to text generation and can have a bit of noise in their output. VAEs, on the other hand, tend to produce very smooth outputs. Current GAN methods are perceived to produce results with fewer artifacts than FVBNs and sharper images than VAEs (Goodfellow 2016) . In the end, any of these methods could have been used with our method as long as they generate clear fingerprint images.
GANs learn to generate images in an unsupervised fashion. There are two parts to GAN; a generator and a discriminator. The generator is typically a neural network that takes random noise as an input and outputs an image. The discriminator is also typically a neural network, it takes an image as an input and classifies it as real or generated. To train the generator to produce images within the domain of the sample images, training happens in three steps:
1. Provide real images to the discriminator. Train the discriminator to classify them as real. 2. Provide generated images to the discriminator. Train it to classify them as generated. 3. Provide the generator with the discriminator's gradients.
Train the generator to produce images that are classified as real.
This process is repeated until the network converges on the distribution of the real data.
A major difficulty during training is keeping the two networks balanced so one doesn't get significantly better than the other. A recent technique to stabilize training is the Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) (Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017) . In standard GAN training, the discriminator classifies the input as either "real" or "generated". The difference between the real data distribution and the generated data is then measured using the Jensen-Shannon divergence (JS) (Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017) . This metric does not provide a gradient everywhere for the generator and therefore requires that the discriminator and generator are closely matched. This makes training unstable. WGAN instead uses an approximation of the Wasserstein distance function to measure the difference between the real and fake distributions (Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017). Since it is differentiable everywhere, it provides meaningful gradients for the generator. The two networks don't have to be well balanced so the discriminator can be better trained preventing mode collapse. This is just one of a few GAN architectures that have recently had success with producing detailed, higher resolution images. Other examples not used here are the Boundary Equilibrium GAN (Berthelot, Schumm, and Metz 2017) and Energy Based GAN (Zhao, Mathieu, and LeCun 2016) .
Datasets
In this work, we model two types of fingerprint images; those scanned from rolled impressions and those obtained from a capacitive sensor. Rolled fingerprints are produced by applying ink to the finger and rolling the finger on paper. Capacitive sensors record ridge information based on where the finger contacts the sensor.
Rolled images The rolled fingerprints come from the publicly available NIST Special Database 9 fingerprint dataset (Watson 1993). The dataset consists of all 10 fingerprints of 5400 unique subjects. Each fingerprint is an 8-bit gray scale image. For each subject, the right thumbprint is selected since that is a common finger used in authentication systems. The images are preprocessed by cropping out the whitespace and then downscaling to 256 × 256 pixels. To get partial fingerprint samples, a random 128 × 128 region is selected every time an image is selected.
Capacitive images The capacitive fingerprint images come from the FingerPass DB7 dataset (Jia et al. 2012) . This dataset has 12 partial fingerprints per each of its 720 subjects. Each partial print is of size 144 × 144 pixels at a resolution of 500 dpi. This is similar to what is scanned by an iPhone (Apple 2017). This is the same dataset used by Roy et al. (Roy, Memon, and Ross 2017) .
Methods
There are two parts to our approach to creating a MasterPrint;
(1) learning the prior distribution of fingerprint images and (2) searching the distribution for an image that satisfies the criteria of a MasterPrint attack. To learn the prior distribution, we use the WGAN method, described earlier, to train a generator network. Our generators receive 100 random numbers as input and output a random fingerprint image. We learn the priors of two different datasets to test how resilient the results are to different types of fingerprint sensors. To search the prior distribution for a MasterPrint, we search the generators' 100 latent variables. We develop two separate techniques for searching this latent space.
It should be noted that there has been some work into how much of a data distribution a GAN actually learns (Arora and Zhang 2017). Arora and Zhang tested a few GAN architectures for diversity and none of the GANs that they tested were able to model the entire data distribution well. From a theoretical perspective, WGAN should be able to do better than the GANs that were tested but there is no experimental proof (Arjovsky, Chintala, and Bottou 2017) . Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the GAN will only model part of the image distribution and our technique might miss.
Latent variable evolution
When there is access to the fingerprint verification system, then the MasterPrint can be directly optimized for that system. This can be achieved by incorporating the fingerprint verification system into the optimization process as a black-box fitness function. To search the latent variables of the image generator for an input that will output a MasterPrint attack, an evolutionary algorithm is a powerful technique. An evolutionary algorithm does not require gradients and therefore is ideal for black-box optimization. For an evolutionary algorithm, a potential optimal solution is represented as a vector. In this case, the vector represents the 100 inputs to the fingerprint generator. A fixed number of these proposed solutions are tested and scored. The best ones are kept and mutated to form the next generation (Eiben, Smith, and others 2003) .
In this paper, we use a specific evolutionary strategy called Covariance Matrix Adaption (CMA-ES). CMA-ES learns the covariance matrix of the variables being optimized. This knowledge allows the algorithm to intelligently guide mutations when many variables are highly correlated (Hansen and Ostermeier 2001) . Since the variables in this work are the inputs to a neural network, there is a high likelihood that many variables will be dependent and this strategy will be more effective than standard evolutionary strategies. In this work, we use Hansen's Python implementation of CMA-ES (Hansen 2006) .
For our work, we use two different datasets and two fingerprint verification systems. To be able to compare our results to previous work (Roy, Memon, and Ross 2017) , we use the widely deployed commercial fingerprint system, VeriFinger 9.0 SDK. To be able to test how well optimization for one black-box transfers to another, we also use the Bozorth3 system. This system is provided open source by NIST as part of their NIST Biometric Image Software (NBIS).
Multi-label activation maximization
When access to the fingerprint verification system is not available, it is necessary to use a proxy verification system. We use a convolutional neural network (CNN) as the proxy system. To use a CNN as a fingerprint verification system, it has to be trained to classify fingerprints by subject. The advantage of using a CNN as the verification system is that it provides a gradient that can be used for optimization. Instead of using evolution to optimize the generator's latent variables, backpropagation can be used.
The CNN is trained on inputs of 128 × 128 partial fingerprint images. For every subject in the dataset, it has a corresponding output class. For a MasterPrint attack, there needs to be a single input that activates all of the CNN's outputs. During optimization, start with random latent variable values, z. Use z to generate an image and calculate a CNN output. Calculate the error for a label corresponding to all the outputs being activated. Backpropagate the error through the CNN and the generator back to z to get z . This repeats until the optimal z is found.
Activation maximization for one or two neurons in a CNN has recently been done in a similar manner by Nguyen et al. (Nguyen et al. 2016) . They used this technique for understanding networks better and proposed using maximizing two neurons for art. Ours is the first instance of this technique at such a large scale, with over 5000 labels that can all be activated at once.
Our CNN architectures are the Residual Network (ResNet) that has achieved superhuman results on the ImageNet classification competition (He et al. 2016) , the smaller, yet powerful, VGG16 architecture (Simonyan and Zisserman 2015), and a simple convolutional design with 3 convolutional layers and 3 fully connected layers on top. To allow these networks to make multi-label predictions, the top layer is replaced. Normally the top layer is a softmax layer, this forces all the outputs to sum to 1 so that the network outputs a probability distribution of its predictions. To make each prediction independent, each class is represented in the top layer by one sigmoid activation function. To produce the training data, many partial fingerprints are sampled from each full fingerprint that is used to identify a subject.
Results

WGAN fingerprints
The results of training the WGAN generator can be seen in Figure 1 . In the right column are the generated images, the left column contains samples from the actual datasets. The image generator seems to have captured the basic structures in both instances. Figure 1a shows partial fingerprints for rolled fingerprints from the NIST dataset. Looking at the right batch, it is clear that the generator has learned the general ridge structure of a fingerprint. Looking closer, there are certain areas that look smudged. Most likely due to the fact that the data is generated from random sections of the fingerprint, the generator had a difficult time learning the more global shapes of a fingerprint. From visual inspection, it appears to have learned the texture. Some of the outputs do look very similar to the input data. Figure 1b displays the results for the capacitive fingerprints. The results look a little better for this dataset. There are fewer smudges on the images and the ridges are better connected. Looking at larger batches, the generated capacitive images are more consistently good the rolled images. This is likely because the capacitive data is cleaner and there is far less detail to learn.
For the generator in 1a, it took 120,000 generator updates before the outputs stopped improving. After 120,000 the generator started to produce blocky images that eventually just became a grid. To avoid this checkered artifact, we replaced all the deconvolutional layers in the generator with upsampling and regular convolutions for the capacitive generator. This removed the artifacts and combined with the cleaner data resulted in a much faster training time for the generator in 1a.
Latent variable evolution
To test the results of the Latent Variable Evolution (LVE) method, we devised a number of different tests. Both generators are optimized for the VeriFinger verification system, as seen in Figure 2 . Similar to the work of Roy et al. (Roy, Memon, and Ross 2017) , the system is tested at three different security levels, namely, at a 1%, 0.1%, and 0.01% False Match Rate (FMR). The FMR is the probability that an impostor fingerprint will be marked as a match. If the FMR is set too high, the system is not very secure. If it is too low, it will reject too many legitimate fingerprint readings. The results for both generators are attained by using the VeriFinger system as a blackbox on a training capacitive dataset. The results are scored by the match rate against the test capacitive dataset using both the VeriFinger and Bozarth3 system. Our results were comparable to previous minutiae-level Master-Prints (Roy, Memon, and Ross 2017) . To further understand how well these results generalize to other systems, the fingerprints optimized for VeriFinger are also scored on the Bozorth3 system.
In Table 1 the percentage of false subject matches are displayed. The number of false subject matches is the number of subjects in the dataset that the MasterPrint matches. Each subject in the dataset is represented by 12 partial fingerprints, to get a subject match only 1 in 12 have to match. The second row in the table shows the results on the VeriFinger system when used with the test data. The third row is the percentage of subject matches where the fingerprints are matched with the Bozorth3 system. The MasterPrints that are optimized for VeriFinger are instead used with the Bozorth3 verification system and matched to the test data. The results show how well the MasterPrint works between different verification systems.
Rolled MasterPrints
The three rolled MasterPrints make up the top of Figure 2 . Each MasterPrint has around 20 minutiae points. At the lowest security level, 1% FMR, a single MasterPrint is able to match with 78% of the people in the dataset. This is a large number of subjects but it is unlikely that many systems are running with this low of a security setting. At the 0.1% FMR level, the MasterPrint matches 8.61% of the dataset. This represents a much more realistic security expectation and is a much higher number of matches than the FMR would lead one to expect. At the highest security level (FMR 0.01%), the attack results aren't very good, but this is also an unlikely security level as it would be inconvenient to A very interesting part of the results is how well these MasterPrints do on the Bozorth3 verification system. These fingerprints are not optimized for it and yet the results are still good. At the medium security setting, the MasterPrint actually does better on the Bozorth3 system. This suggests that the fingerprint features in the MasterPrint that allow it to match so many subjects have general properties and it is not just targeting quirks in the VeriFinger system. Since both systems are minutiae based, it does not suggest generality beyond minutiae systems but it is an important first step in showing that these results are applicable.
Capacitive MasterPrints
The three capacitive Master-Prints make up the bottom row of Figure 2 . Since all the match rates are for capacitive data, the capacitive Master-Prints are much more visually similar to the subject data than the rolled MasterPrints. This should allow these MasterPrints to do better than the rolled MasterPrints. Looking at Table   1 , the results are, as a whole, a little better than the rolled MasterPrints. At the 0.01% FMR level, the results are much better. A one in five subject match rate is very bad for an authentication system.
The results on the Bozorth3 system, on the other hand, are not nearly as good as what is seen with the rolled Master-Print. One explanation for this is that the Bozorth3 system is designed and tested for the NIST data which consists of rolled fingerprint impressions. It may struggle with the capacitive MasterPrints. The images produced from the capacitive generator have much thicker ridges which mean the model might be less flexible in targeting the system. The rolled Mas-terPrints are for the most part coherent while the capacitive MasterPrints have a lot of noise at the center of the image. Noise can easily target an individual system, but it does not usually transfer. Figure 2 supports this observation.
Comparative Results
The results obtained by our technique for a single MasterPrint are an advancement over the state of the art achieved by Roy et al. (Roy, Memon, and Ross 2017) . Figure 2 has the results of the minutiae approaches and our best capacitive MasterPrint. Our result for a single MasterPrint is comparable to using 5 MasterPrints from previous work. We would expect significantly better results if we sequentially optimized five MasterPrints. 
Multi-label activation maximization
The Multi-Label Activation Maximization (MLAM) technique uses a CNN as a proxy for the fingerprint verification system. Yet, to analyze the quality of its results, we have to compare it to a benchmark. For this, we once again use the VeriFinger matching system on the FingerPass dataset. This allows us to analyze how well the CNN acts as a proxy to an unknown verification system. In analyzing the MLAM MasterPrints on the VeriFinger system, we found that the results are very noisy. With MLAM, the results are highly dependent on the initial latent variable values. The values are incremented to maximize the sum of the label outputs in the proxy classifier but often get stuck in local maxima. To reduce the dependence on the initial latent values, we try 50 random times and after training all 50, take the best result. This helps to stabilize and reduce the noise in the scores assigned by the proxy network. Despite the proxy network scoring the MasterPrints similarly, the scores from the VeriFinger system are not very consistent. This implies that which features that get optimized is highly dependent on the initial random seed at the beginning of training. To be able to analyze the effects of MLAM despite the noise, we produce 30 samples for every test and use the average value. Despite the high variability in their score, all of the optimized samples look very similar. Part of this perception is probably related to people's poor ability to distinguish fingerprints. Yet the fingerprints in Figure 3 are much more self similar than they are similar to other fingerprints presented in this paper.
Rolled MasterPrint The images in Figure 3a are created using the rolled fingerprint generator and optimized with a CNN using the ResNet architecture. The attack accuracy in terms of subject match rate using these MasterPrints is presented in Table 3 . The Rolled data column shows the average match rate for MLAM Masterprints, images generated at random, and random rolled fingerprint data samples. These results are reported for a 1% FMR. The results show that the rolled MasterPrints designed using this method match 20% of the subjects in the dataset. This can be compared to the MasterPrints optimized through evolution which has a match rate of 78%. The difference here is the optimization system has no knowledge of the verification system or even of minutiae. Verification systems that use minutiae will have an emphasis on endpoints and parts of the fingerprint considered important by the people that defined minutiae. The score on this proxy system shows the general feature optimization that is happening irrespective of the type of verification system.
Due to the high variance in the results, it is important to prove that the system is optimizing the fingerprints. To do this, we run a 1 way ANOVA on the three groups to test for statistical significance between the groups. This results in F = 22.88 with a p value much lower than 0.01. Running Tukey's HSD post-hoc test shows more specifically that the difference between the optimized fingerprint and both random fingerprints are significant at p < .01. This means that we can be over 99% certain that the optimized results are better than the unoptimized results and that both results are better than random data. We tried to test against random noise, but the verification system could not detect any minutiae points. While we expected the optimized results to be better than unoptimized results, we did not expect that the generated results to have a higher match rate in general than the training data. This suggests that the adversarial training used to train the image generator is already capitalizing on general features found in the dataset. The images being generated are already prototypical fingerprints which make them natural MasterPrints. For this particular context, loss of variability in the generated images has its advantages.
Optimizing for the proxy CNN verification system doubles the match rate from the randomly generated results. Looking at these images in Figure 3 , they do not really look like fingerprints. Of all the outputs we looked at from both generators, these images looked the least like real fingerprints. They look like fingerprints with parts whited out. One possibility is that the bottom and right edge of the fingerprints in our data have a lot of similarities while the rest of the image is where most of the unique aspects are. By having nothing in the unique regions, the fingerprints are less likely to get rejected for individual matches.
Capacitive MasterPrint The images in Figure 3b are created using the capacitive fingerprint generator and optimized with a CNN using the ResNet architecture. The results for the capacitive generator are on the right side of Table 3 . For the capacitive data we experimented with the proxy architectures to test how the CNN architecture effects the effectiveness of the fingerprint designs.
As was done with the rolled MasterPrint results, the five groups of "MasterPrints" are analyzed with a 1 way ANOVA. This results in F = 6.18 with a p value much lower than 0.01. This is a lower F than the rolled data results but still significant. Running Tukey's HSD post-hoc test shows that the three optimized groups are significantly different than the random data at p < 0.01. The effect size here is not large but the results follow what we have already seen. The randomly generated results have roughly twice the number of matches as the real data, and the optimized results are roughly twice as good as the random results. The main difference is the capacitive data gets fewer matches than the rolled data. This may again be related to the much lower number of ridges in the capacitive images.
The different CNN architectures did not make a difference. It is interesting that a 6, 16, and 50 layer network all have the same effect in terms of optimizing a MasterPrint. This demonstrates the robustness of the results but also makes us question what features these networks are all optimizing. Looking at the MasterPrint images for all three architectures, they all appear similar. If we had optimized for hidden layers instead of the output of the CNN, then the internal representations of these networks might have been more important. This analysis indicates that the underlying data is one of the most important aspects in generating a MasterPrint.
Conclusion
This paper presents two related methods for generating Mas-terPrints; partial fingerprints which can be used for dictionary attacks on fingerprint verification systems. Both methods start with training a Wasserstein GAN on a fingerprint dataset. They then search for latent variable values, "inputs", for a GAN generator that maximizes the number of people the output of the generator matches. The first method, which requires access to an external fingerprint recognition system, uses evolutionary computation to find the variable values. The second method instead trains a neural network to do multi-label classification of the fingerprints. It uses gradient descent to find the latent variable values. The results of our methods beat the state of the art, and unlike previous work, which only worked in the space of minutiae, our method generates complete fingerprint images and takes us a step closer to a practical MasterPrint attack. Testing with three different CNN architectures, two different fingerprint recognition systems, and two different datasets, show that the method is robust and not dependent on the artifacts of any particular fingerprint recognition system. Future testing should verify the effectiveness of this system in the wild, against e.g. smartphone fingerprint recognition systems. It is also plausible that the method could be extended to many other biometric modalities that are vulnerable to presentation attacks.
Beyond the application of MasterPrints, this paper successfully shows the usefulness of searching the latent space of a generator network for images, or other artifacts, that meet a given certain objective. This idea is surprisingly underexplored and could be useful in computational creativity research as well as other security domains.
